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THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN EQUITABLE CASES
EDWARD E. ERICKSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether the issues within a civil case 1 entitle
a party to a jury trial has been the subject of repeated and intense
argument before the North Dakota Supreme Court in recent
years.' Initially, the right to a jury trial depends upon the status of
the case as an action at law or an action in equity.3 However, if
legal issues which entitle a party to a jury are raised in an equitable
case,4 the legal issues are tried to a jury, and the equitable issues
are later tried to the court.5 Whether a defendant is entitled to a
jury in an equitable case depends on whether the defendant raises
a legal or equitable issue,6 and whether, assuming a legal issue, it is
a counterclaim or a defense.'
II. ORIGINS OF THE JURY TRIAL IN NORTH DAKOTA
The constitutional right to a civil trial by jury8 is found in the
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1. The scope of this article is limited to North Dakota civil actions.
2. See, for recent examples, First Am. Bank West v. Michalenko, 501 N.W.2d 330 (N.D.
1993); Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1993); Cook v. Hansen,
499 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1993); Farm Credit Bank v. Rub, 481 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1992); Adolph
Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1276 (1992), reh'g
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992); First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633 (N.D.
1991); Land Office Co. v. Clapp-Thomssen Co., 442 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1989).
3. Dakota Bank and Trust Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 437 N.W.2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1989)
(citations omitted).
4. First Am. Bank West v. Michalenko, 501 N.W.2d 330, 332 (N.D. 1993). Although
there is no absolute right to a jury trial in an equitable case, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has never recognized the converse right to have an equitable action tried to the
court without a jury. Id. A trial court may on its own initiative try a nonjury case with an
advisory jury. N.D. R. CIv. P. 39(c).
5. Ask, Inc. v. Wegerle, 286 N.W.2d 290, 296 (N.D. 1979).
6. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Cowger, 303 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1981).
7. Great Plains Supply Co. v. Erickson, 398 N.W.2d 732, 735 (N.D. 1986).
8. The right to a civil jury trial contained in the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution does not apply to the states, which implies that a federal claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment is not available. See Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973),
reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973); Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Schroeder, 384 N.W.2d 626,
629 (Neb. 1986). However, the Seventh Amendment did extend to the territory of Dakota,
and hence, is a source of precedent when interpreting the North Dakota Constitution if the
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North Dakota Constitution, which provides in part: "The right of
trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate."9 How-
ever, that right exists as it was known and understood when the
constitution was adopted in 1889.10 This means that any modifica-
tion of the common law right to a jury trial which was adopted
before our first state constitution was enacted will be included
within this definition."
Our right to a jury trial has been preserved as it existed at the
time our constitution was enacted.' If there was no right to a jury
trial for a particular issue in 1889, then there is no constitutional
right to a jury trial on that issue today. 13 Therefore, the full scope
of the right to a jury trial is different than the general question of
whether an issue is equitable or legal, although those terms have
often been used in determining the scope of this right.' 4 This
usage occurred because the historical distinction i5 between courts
of law, in which there was a right to a jury trial, and courts of
equity, in which there was no such right, 6 largely determined
whether there was a right to a jury trial when the constitution was
adopted. 1
7
III. DETERMINING WHETHER AN ISSUE IS LEGAL OR
EQUITABLE
Difficulties arise in determining whether a particular issue will
be equitable or legal because the answer may depend upon the
North Dakota Constitution, statutes or court precedent does not address the issue. Power v.
Williams, 205 N.W. 9, 11-12 (N.D. 1925).
9. N.D. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 13. See also N.D. R. Civ. P. 38(a). "The right of trial by
jury as declared by the constitution of the United States or by the constitution of the state of
North Dakota or as given by a statute of the United States or of the state of North Dakota
shall be preserved to the parties inviolate." Id.
10. Smith v. Kunert, 115 N.W. 76, 77 (N.D. 1907) (referring to the Constitution of 1889
and quoting that "the right to trial by jury shall be secured to all and remain inviolate").
11. Barry v. Truax, 99 N.W. 769, 771-72 (N.D. 1904) (noting that territorial statutes
providing for a change of venue in criminal cases are incorporated into the constitutional
right to a jury trial in derogation of the common law right to a trial in the county in which
the offense occurred).
12. City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1984).
13. In re R.Z., 415 N.W.2d 486,488 n.1 (N.D. 1987) (conceding that "there was no right
to a jury trial in mental health proceedings in 1889" and holding that there was no
constitutional right to a jury trial in the present proceeding). However, a statute could
provide a nonconstitutional right to a jury trial. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
14. See First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635 (N.D. 1991).
15. See Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 462 (N.D. 1978). New causes of action are
analogized to the older common law causes of action in determining whether the federal
right to a civil jury trial extends to the new cause of action. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417 (1987).
16. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman, 338 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1983). This
distinction is retained despite the merger of law and equity into one form of action.
17. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
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remedy which is being sought as much as the nature of the sub-
ject.' The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the right
to a jury trial exists today in those cases which involve a right to a
jury trial when the state constitution was adopted. 9 The court has
compared modern cases with both the subject matter and the
remedy sought in pre-1889 cases, but the court has not specified
an exact method of inquiry.20 The United States Supreme Court
has established a method to determine whether a new cause of
action, such as one created by statute, is legal or equitable by com-
paring it to suits tried in courts of law and suits tried in courts of
equity in the eighteenth century.2 ' The federal method does not
contradict North Dakota law and may be a useful method of analy-
sis if a complex new issue arises in North Dakota.2
Under the federal method, both the subject of the action and
the nature of the remedy sought must be examined.23 As men-
tioned earlier, the cause of action is compared to eighteenth cen-
tury actions at law or actions in equity.24 However, the proper
characterization of "the relief sought is 'more important' than
finding a precisely analogous common law cause of action .... "2
The underlying purpose of the remedy sought is important.
As an example of how courts look to the underlying remedy
when defining the purpose of the action, in Tull v. United States,26
the federal government sought a civil penalty for violations of the
Clean Water Act. The government sought civil penalties and an
injunction against a developer who had filled in protected wet-
lands. 27 Because the action was more akin to an action at law for
punishment than an action in equity for disgorging improper prof-
18. 27 AM. JuR. 2d Equity §§ 52, 53; Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 ("To determine whether a
statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in
courts of equity.. ., the Court must examine both the nature of the action and the remedy
sought.").
19. City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 764 (N.D. 1984).
20. See id. at 765. Although Altevogt is a criminal case, it was cited in a civil case, In re
R.Z., 415 N.W.2d 486, 488 n.1 (N.D. 1987), and it cited to a;civil case, General Electric
Credit Corp. v. Richman, 338 N.W.2d 814 (N.D. 1983). This implies that the holding in
Altevogt would apply to civil cases on this issue.
21. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
22. Of course, the North Dakota Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial as it
existed when it was adopted in 1889, Smith v. Kunert, 115 N.W. 76, 77 (N.D. 1908), while
the federal Constitution preserves that right as it existed when the Seventh Amendment
was adopted in 1791, Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 374 (1974). Variations in this
or other particular details do not affect the method of analysis.
23. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 421 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 414-15.
27. Id.
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its, the court stated that the defendant had a right to a jury trial.'
North Dakota has essentially made the same analysis without
actually stating the method outright. For example, the North
Dakota Supreme Court addressed the right to a jury in a case
involving the alleged violation of local dog control ordinances.2 9
The court examined the nature of the case-the violation of a city
ordinance-and compared the present state law with statutes dat-
ing back to Territorial days.30 The court concluded that the stat-
ute gave the defendant a right to a jury trial, despite the fact that
petty offenses do not entitle the defendant to a jury trial as a mat-
ter of constitutional right.31 This method of analysis, by examining
prior similar statutes defining the action, parallels the method of
analysis adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Tull.
Many actions have been defined as legal or equitable by stat-
ute or by the supreme court. Equity actions include actions for
cancellation of a contract,32 the foreclosure of a mortgage,33
divorce,34 quieting title,35 specific performance,36 and an injunc-
tion or preventive relief 37 Special proceedings, such as applica-
tions for writs of certiorari,3 8 mandamus, 39 and prohibition,40 are
tried to a judge, as are applications for a writ of habeas corpus.4 '
28. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424-25.
29. City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 761, 764-65 (N.D. 1984).
30. Id. at 764-65.
31. Id. at 765-66.
32. Fedorenko v. Rudman, 71 N.W.2d 332, 335 (N.D. 1955). "Rescission of a contract,
whether the object of a suit in equity or an action at law, is governed by equitable
principles." Id. The remedy is not an absolute right but is discretionary with the court.
Heinsohn v. William Clairmont, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 511, 513 (N.D. 1985). "Cancellation of a
contract for deed by action is an action in equity." Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d
73,75 (N.D. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1276, (1992), reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992).
33. First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635 (N.D. 1991) (finding
that foreclosure of a mortgage is an equitable proceeding).
34. Martian v. Martian, 328 N.W.2d 844, 846 (N.D. 1983). However, "actions for
divorce are not equitable actions in the normal sense" because "[t]he jurisdiction of the
courts . . . to grant divorces and to order alimony and property division is entirely
statutory." Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 482 (N.D. 1978).
35. Alfson v. Anderson,; 78 N.W.2d 693, 701 (N.D. 1956) (recognizing that action to
quiet title is essentially an action of equity).
36. Alfson, 78 N.W.2d at 701 (opining that "[s]pecific performance is an equitable
remedy governed by equitable principles").
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-06-02 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
38. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-33-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991). A writ of certiorari shall be
granted by the supreme court or district court when an inferior court or government
agency or officer has exceeded its jurisdiction. Id.
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-34-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991). "The writ of mandamus may be
issued by the supreme and district courts to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person to compel the performance of an act" pursuant to duty. Id.
40. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-35-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991). "The writ of prohibition is the
counterpart to the writ of mandamus." Id. It may be issued by the supreme or district
court to an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person to prohibit actions taken outside
of their jurisdiction. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-35-02 (1976 & Supp. 1991).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-22-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991). "Every person imprisoned or
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Also, applications to establish the date and place of a person's
birth,42 a person's residency and citizenship, 3 or a petition to
change the name of a person4 4 or city,4 5 are made to the court
pursuant to statute.
Actions at law in which the right to a jury trial exists include
actions for the recovery of money only, 6 damages in eminent
domain actions,47 and damages in claim and delivery actions.48
The Rules of Civil Procedure also recognize the right to a jury trial
when a state or federal statute grants that right.49 Additionally,
issues of fact in declaratory judgment actions may be determined
by a judge or jury as they would be in the underlying civil action.50
IV. THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
The plaintiff has the first opportunity to shape the case by
drafting the complaint to allege either legal or equitable issues.
Although the major issue in drafting a complaint is finding which
remedy or remedies best suit the client's needs,5' other issues may
be important to the lawyer, if not to the law, such as the complex-
restrained . . .may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such
imprisonment" and seek relief if it is unlawful. Id. The writ of habeas corpus may be
granted by the supreme court or the district court. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-22-04 (1976 &
Supp. 1991).
42. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-37-04 (1976). If, after a hearing, the court is satisfied that
the petitioner has proven his or her citizenship and the date and place of birth, the court
"shall make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall order a judgment
to that effect[.]" Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-27-02(3) (1976).
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-27-05 (1976). "If, after the hearing, the court is satisfied
that the petitioner is a bona fide citizen of ... North Dakota, it shall make appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall order a judgment to that effect[.]" Id.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-28-02 (1976 & Supp. 1991). The judge of the district court,
upon satisfactory proof, shall order the change of the petitioner's name. Id.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-28-03 (1976 & Supp. 1991). Upon satisfactory proof, the
district court of the county in which the petitioning city is located may order the change of
the city's name. Id.
46. First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635 (N.D. 1991) (finding
that "[a]n action at law for recovery of money only is triable to a jury as a matter of right").
47. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-01 (1976 & Supp. 1991). Unless a jury is waived,
compensation for the taking of private property for public use shall in all cases be
ascertained by jury. Id.
48. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-07-12 (1976). See also Cook v. Hansen, 499 N.W.2d 94, 97
(N.D. 1993) (holding that "[a]n action for possession of personal property or the recovery of
money for that property is triable to a jury upon proper demand") (citation omitted)).
49. N.D. R. Civ. P. 38(a). "The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution of
the United States or by the constitution of the state of North Dakota or as given by a statute
of the United States or of the state of North Dakota shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate." Id.
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-09 (1976). "When a [declaratory judgment] proceeding
... involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in
the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court
in which the proceeding is pending." Id.
51. "[A] party may obtain an equitable remedy even if he has a remedy at law if the
equitable remedy is better adjusted to rendering complete justice." A & A Metal Buildings
v. I-S, Inc., 274 N.W.2d 183, 189 n.2 (N.D. 1978).
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ity of a case, 5 2 or how the factfinder may react if basic moral prin-
ciples differ from the law.5 3 These decisions are matters better
decided by the individual lawyer's beliefs and personality or by
the client's position rather than through the analysis of statutes
and caselaw.
A. THE PLAINTIFF MUST PLEAD FACTS SHOWING A CLAIM
FOR EQUITABLE OR LEGAL RELIEF
In determining whether a complaint sets forth facts entitling
the plaintiff to a jury trial, courts will examine the pleadings to
determine whether the issues are legal or equitable, including
both the prayer for relief and the allegations of fact.54 When a
claim seeking legal relief is "merely incidental to and dependent
upon the right to equitable relief," there is no right to have a jury
determine the legal issue.5 Thus, in Lithun v. Grand Forks Pub.
Sch. Dist. No. 1,56 a plaintiff sought an equitable injunction rein-
stating his employment as a schoolteacher and also asked for legal
money damages.5 7 The damage claims that could have been
awarded by the trial court were incidental to the injunction, and
the existence of factual issues relating to those claims did not enti-
52. Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 463 (N.D. 1978) (stating that complexity of the
case is not sufficient reason to deny a jury trial to a person entitled to one). However, in one
case in which a party moved for a jury trial after having waived that right, the supreme
court agreed with the trial judge that the complexity of the case was one of the reasons
weighing against granting a jury trial. Hanson v. Williams County, 452 N.W.2d 313, 314-15
(N.D. 1990). I am personally aware of one case involving complex issues of causation and
damages, which is pending in the trial court as this is being written, where one of the
attorneys told me that the parties agreed to a bench trial because they believed that the
issues were too difficult for a jury. The author has not yet formed a personal opinion on this
matter.
53. Basic moral principles may come into a case and either affect the outcome despite
the law, or, more subtly, how the factfinder views the truthfulness of a witness. In a recent
decision reversing a foreclosure action and remanding for a new trial because the trial
judge had been represented by the plaintiff's counsel, Surrogate Justice Pederson
concurred, stating:
I start with the basic premise that "when you borrow, you have to repay."
Psalms, Chapter 37-Verse 21; Proverbs, Chapter 3-Verses 27 and 28; and
Proverbs, Chapter 22-Verse 7, all seem to tell me that. Does a lender have to
proceed with exactitude and be somehow "otherwise qualified" to collect when
payments are overdue? What kinds of errors by the court will hereafter be held
to be alterations of the basic premise?
Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 880 (N.D. 1993) (Pederson, S.J., con-
curring specially). The trial court's decision was reversed, despite the fact that "the record
show[ed] beyond question that [the trial judge] fairly tried this case." Id. Although I do not
have any empirical data in support of this proposition, Surrogate Justice Pederson's opinion
probably speaks for a majority of potential North Dakota jurors. A nonlawyer may not have
agreed to reverse and remand this particular case for a new trial.
54. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman, 338 N.W.2d 814, 817 (N.D. 1983).
55. Lithun v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 307 N.W.2d 545, 548-49 (N.D. 1981).
56. 307 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1981).
57. Lithun v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 307 N.W.2d 545 (N.D. 1981).
564
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tie the plaintiff to a trial by jury.58 The same rule also has been
applied in reverse. In a minority shareholders' action against the
majority shareholder of a closely held corporation, the court found
that the plaintiffs' request for incidental equitable relief could not
be used to deprive them of their right to a jury trial on their legal
claims for money damages.5 9
B. PLAINTIFFS SEEKING TO AVOID A JURY MUST SHOW
THAT ONLY EQUITABLE RELIEF IS BEING SOUGHT
A plaintiff seeking to avoid a jury trial must "clearly and
unambiguously" show in the complaint that only equitable relief is
being sought.60 In Moses v. Burleigh County,6 a plaintiff brought
a case in which he originally sought an injunction, but later
amended the complaint to only include money damages.62 Based
on the amended complaint, and over the plaintiff's objection, the
defendant was entitled to a jury trial.63 Therefore, the form of the
complaint is not the determining factor. For example, the plaintiff
in Kilgore v. Farmers Union Oil Co.64 sought to avoid a jury trial in
an action for a money judgment by seeking an equitable account-
ing. 65 The complaint only alleged facts showing legal breach of
contract and the facts pled failed to show grounds necessary for an
accounting.66 It was error, therefore, for the trial court to deny
the defendant's demand for a jury trial.67 Thus, a defendant who
wants a jury trial should carefully analyze and contest the com-
plaint on both the legal and factual issues.
C. INCIDENTAL RELIEF WILL NOT OVERCOME THE
PRINCIPLE CLAIM
When a complaint seeks both legal and equitable relief, the
analysis should be taken a step further by examining which rem-
edy sought is the primary claim and which remedy is incidental to
58. Id. at 548-49.
59. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 800 (N.D. 1991).
60. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman, 338 N.W.2d 814, 818 (N.D. 1983). In
Richman, the supreme court found that the complaint could reasonably have been
construed as seeking either equitable or legal relief and held that "the trial court erred in
denying the [defendants'] demand for a trial by jury." Id. at 818-19.
61. 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989).
62. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 194 (N.D. 1989).
63. Id.
64. 24 N.W.2d 26 (1946).
65. Kilgore v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 24 N.W.2d 26, 27 (N.D. 1946).
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 30-31.
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or dependent upon that primary claim.6 8 For instance, the plain-
tiff in CI. T Corp. v. Hetland,6 9 sought both the foreclosure of a
mortgage and a money judgment for the amount of the note, and
the supreme court found that the case was properly tried to the
court because the money judgment was an inherent part of the
foreclosure.7 ° However, in Schumacher v. Schumacher,7 1 the
plaintiffs sought a money judgment for damages and an equitable
implied trust on the defendants' real estate.72 The Schumacher
court found that the implied trust was "incidental to and depen-
dent upon [the] legal claims for damages." 73
V. THE DEFENDANT'S CASE
A defendant who wants a jury trial when the plaintiff's claim
initially appears to be one of equity should first examine the com-
plaint to see if it truly is an equitable claim.7 4 If the complaint
truly is in equity, then it may still be possible to allege as a counter-
claim a legal issue entitling the defendant to a jury trial as to those
issues.75 However,
[w]henever the issues are so interrelated that a decision in
the nonjury portion might affect the decision of the jury
portion, the jury portion is to be tried first, since other-
wise the party entitled to the jury trial would be deprived
of part or all or his right to a jury trial.76
By doing this, it may be possible to have the important fact issues
decided by a jury. However, there is a risk with this procedure
that the court might hold that the counterclaim is a defense or
incidental to a defense, which would not entitle the defendant to a
jury trial on any of the issues raised.77
A. DEFENSE OR COUNTERCLAIM
The distinction between a defense and a counterclaim is nec-
68. Production Credit Ass'n v. Rub, 475 N.W.2d 532, 537 (N.D. 1991); Lithun v. Grand
Forks Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 307 N.W.2d 545, 549 (N.D. 1981).
69. 143 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1966).
70. C.I.T. Corp. v. Hetland, 143 N.W.2d 94, 101 (N.D. 1966).
71. 469 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1991).
72. Schumacher v. Schumacher, 469 N.W.2d 793, 796 (N.D. 1991).
73. Id. at 800.
74. See Kilgore v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 24 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (N.D. 1946).
75. See Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 462 (N.D. 1978) (citing Lehman v. Coulter,
168 N.W.2d 724 (N.D. 1918)).
76. Id. at 463.
77. See Sargent County State Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 868 (N.D. 1993);
First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635 (N.D. 1991).
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essarily fact specific to each case. The defendant's designation of
an issue as a defense or counterclaim in the pleadings is not deter-
minative by itself because the trial court has the authority to prop-
erly designate the issues if the party's label is shown to be
incorrect.7  The test used by the supreme court is whether the
allegations negate the claim being made, which has been labeled a
defense, or whether the allegations present an independent cause
of action, which has been labeled a counterclaim.79 If an issue is
one of the affirmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c) of the North
Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, 0 the issue would probably be
designated as a defense to the plaintiff's claim whether or not the
defense is legal or equitable.8 ' This is also true with compulsory
counterclaims under the Rules.8 2
1. A Defense is Defined as the Negation of the
Plaintiff's Claim
The negation of the other party's claim has been the primary
factor in determining whether a legal issue raised in opposition is a
defense or is incidental to a defense. In First Nat'l Bank and Trust
v. Brakken, 3 the defendant's allegations of "failure of considera-
tion and fraudulent inducement," if proven, would have negated
the plaintiff's claims based upon a note and a mortgage. 4 These
allegations were found to be defenses because they controverted
the opposing party's claims.8 5 Likewise, a claim of unjust enrich-
ment raised as a counterclaim against a trustee who was suing to
cancel a contract for deed was incidental to a defense because it
78. N.D. R. Civ. P. 8(c). "When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall
treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." Id. See also Great Plains
Supply Co. v. Erickson, 398 N.W.2d 732, 735 (N.D. 1986).
79. See First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 636 (N.D. 1991).
80. N.D. R. CIv. P. 8(c). The listed affirmative defenses are "accord and satisfaction,
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
Id.
81. See Ask, Inc. v. Wegerle, 286 N.W.2d 290, 295 (N.D. 1979) (stating that "the raising
of affirmative legal defenses in equitable actions, such as the ones listed in N.D. R. Civ. P.
8(c), does not change an action from one triable before the court to one triable before a
jury").
82. A compulsory counterclaim is "any claim the pleader has against any opposing
party when the pleading is served, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require [additional parties] of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." N.D. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
83. 468 N.W.2d 633 (N.D. 1991).
84. First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 636 (N.D. 1991).
85. Id.
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was "incidental to and dependent upon one of [the] defenses
.... "86 It appears that whether a defendant's claim against the
plaintiff is a permissive or compulsory counterclaim as defined in
Rule 13(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure is less
important than whether the defendant's claim negates the plain-
tiff's claim.
2. A Legal Claim for Damages by the Defendant is
Not Sufficient to Obtain a Jury Trial if it is
Incidental to and Dependent Upon the
Defense to an Equitable Action
Even when a defendant raises an issue denominated as a
counterclaim for money damages, the defendant "is not entitled to
a jury trial if the damage claim is incidental to and dependent
upon a primary claim for which a jury trial is not allowed.""7 For
example, in Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 8 a farmer made
damage claims relating to the allegedly wrongful seizure of live-
stock and equipment by a foreclosing lender.89 The court found
those claims incidental to and dependent upon the success of the
farmer's defenses against the debt because the seizures were not
wrongful unless the farmer was successful in defending against the
foreclosure action.9" Similarly, a defendant seeking money dam-
ages at law for breach of a mortgage agreement was not entitled to
a jury trial because those damages were dependent upon the
defendant's success against the plaintiff's equitable foreclosure
claim.91 Even when a defendant alleged mental or emotional dis-
tress resulting from the plaintiff's actions in a foreclosure case as a
counterclaim, that claim was found to be incidental to and depen-
dent upon her success in defending against the plaintiff's claims
because the allegedly wrongful actions taken by the plaintiff would
only be wrongful under these circumstances if the plaintiff could
prove her defenses of failure of consideration and fraudulent
inducement in the mortgage contract.92
86. Adolph Rub Trust v. Rub, 474 N.W.2d 73, 75-76 (N.D. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1276 (1992), reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992).
87. Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 873 (N.D. 1993).
88. 500 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1993).
89. Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862, 873 (N.D. 1993).
90. Id.
91. Farm Credit Bank v. Rub, 481 N.W.2d 451, 458 (N.D. 1992).
92. First Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (N.D. 1991).
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3. Procedural Rules Defining Compulsory
Counterclaims Are Not Reliable Guides to
Whether an Issue is a Defense or
Counterclaim
The definition of a counterclaim under the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is not a reliable determining factor in regard to whether an
issue is a defense or an independent cause of action. A compulsory
counterclaim under the Rules is a claim which arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the suit.9"
For example, in Graven v. Backus,94 the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's building encroached upon his land and sought an
injunction requiring its removal.95 The defendant countered by
denying the encroachment and seeking either dismissal or, in the
alternative, a forced sale of the encroached land from the plaintiff
to the defendant.96 The alternative remedy was found to be a
compulsory counterclaim because it was auxiliary to the original
action and dependent upon the original claim.9 7 This holding was
made despite the fact that had the original suit not been brought,
it may still have been possible for the defendant to have brought
this claim as an original action.98 Therefore, it is not sufficient sim-
ply to determine whether a defendant's counterclaim would be
able to stand as a cause of action in a theoretical vacuum without
reference to the plaintiff's complaint.9 9
However, when a counterclaim presented only legal issues
against an equitable claim, the fact that it was found to be a com-
pulsory counterclaim did not affect the defendant's right to a jury
trial on the counterclaim.100 Further, in another case, the plaintiff
alleged an equitable mechanics' lien against the defendants'
house, while the counterclaim sought money damages for
93. N.D. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Such a claim need not be stated if, "at the time the action
was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action," or if the court "did
not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on the claim .... " Id.
94. 163 N.W.2d 320 (N.D. 1968).
95. Graven v. Backus, 163 N.W.2d 321, 323 (N.D. 1968).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 323-24. Although the alternative remedy sought by the defendant was also
equitable, the case is cited here for the definition of the remedy as a compulsory
counterclaim.
98. See Ward v. Shipp, 340 N.W.2d 14 (N.D. 1983).
99. The party who chooses to sue first as plaintiff may have an advantage in positioning
itself regarding the jury issue because that party gets to draft the complaint to seek either
legal or equitable relief. The party who becomes the defendant is left to respond to the
complaint and may have to show that the complaint mischaracterized the underlying facts
or that the defendant has an independent counterclaim.
100. Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 463 (N.D. 1978).
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improper workmanship.' 0 1 The supreme court did not determine
whether the legal counterclaim was compulsory or permissive, but
because the allegedly improper workmanship was the same work-
manship secured by the mechanics' liens it would appear to be
compulsory because it arose out of the same transaction or occur-
rence as the complaint.10 2 The counterclaim for money damages
for faulty workmanship did not necessarily negate the mechanics'
liens because the right to money damages for faulty performance
does not always negate the workers' right to payment for the value
of their work. 10 3 Therefore, the defendants' legal claim for dam-
ages was not a defense or incidental to a defense against the
mechanics' lien.
B. PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS ARE ALWAYS
INDEPENDENT FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE BY
DEFINITION
A permissive counterclaim is a "claim ... not arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the oppos-
ing party's claim."' 01 4 The test for whether a counterclaim is per-
missive or compulsory is whether the defendant's claim is logically
related to the plaintiff's claim that is the subject of the action.'05
Therefore, a permissive counterclaim, not being logically related
to the claim, would always be an independent cause of action.'0 6
If the permissive counterclaim is legal in nature, then a jury trial
may be had as a matter of right on the counterclaim, regardless of
the equitable nature of the complaint.' 7
101. Ask, Inc., v. Wegerle, 286 N.W.2d 290, 291 (N.D. 1979).
102. See N.D. R. Civ, P. 13(a).
103. See Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 201, 210 (N.D. 1974) (finding that the
contractor could claim the amount due under the contract, but would have to respond in
damages for the defects in the performance when the contractor did not willfully default
and when there was substantial performance).
104. N.D. R. CIv. P. 13(b).
105. Dangerud v. Dobesh, 353 N.W.2d 328, 330 (N.D. 1984) (citing Leo Lumber Co. v.
Williams, 191 N.W.2d 573, 577 (N.D.1971)).
106. Under Rule 38 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, a party waives the
right to a jury trial unless a demand for one was made no later than ten days after service of
the last pleading directed to that issue. See Land Office Co. v. Clapp-Thomssen Co., 442
N.W.2d 401, 403 (N.D. 1989). Once waived, "the right to trial by jury on that issue cannot
be revived by amending or supplementing a pleading." Id. However, "[i]f new issues are
raised by amended or supplemental pleadings, a previously waived right to a jury trial is
revived only to the new issues." Id. A permissive counterclaim would contain such new
issues, allowing a previous waiver of the right to a jury trial to be revived as to the new
issues which are raised.
107. See Ask, Inc. v. Wegerle, 286 N.W.2d 290, 296 (N.D. 1979).
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C. THE RISK OF SEPARATE TRIALS OR SEVERANCE
The trial court may order the separate trial within a case of
"any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of
any separate issue.., or issues" in order to avoid inconvenience or
prejudice.'08 The trial court also could sever any claim against a
party and proceed with it in a separate case. 10 9 In either instance,
the decision is subject to the abuse of discretion standard. 10 Ques-
tions involved in separating issues for trial could include a consid-
eration of whether separate, distinct issues could be tried apart to
avoid delay on some of the issues." 1  Severance of a single case is
appropriate when the claims are unrelated."12
A counterclaim is subject to possible severance if it does not
negate the plaintiff's claims as a defense. If the defendant's legal
counterclaim is severed as a separate case, the defendant would
not be able to have the jury's determination govern the equitable
issues. 13 However, if the defendant's legal counterclaim is merely
separated for trial, it would still be possible for the legal claims to
be first determined by a jury and the equitable claims decided in
light of the jury's verdict.
VI. TRIALS INVOLVING BOTH LEGAL AND EQUITABLE
ISSUES
When there are legal and equitable issues in the same case,
there must be a determination of to what extent the issues are
tried to a jury or to the court. Generally, when there are legal
issues which entitle a party to a jury trial, they should be tried to
108. N.D. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
109. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 21.
110. Giese v. Engelhardt, 175 N.W.2d 578, 583 (N.D. 1970). The supreme court has
cautioned that care should be taken to distinguish between Rule 21 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for severing claims, and Rule 42(b) of the Rules,
which provides for separate trials within the same case. Federal Land Bank v. Wallace, 366
N.W.2d 444, 448 n. 1 (N.D. 1985); Schell v. Schumacher, 298 N.W.2d 474, 477 n.5 (N.D.
1980).
111. See Schell v. Schumacher, 298 N.W.2d 474, 477 (N.D. 1980).
112. See Federal Land Bank v. Wallace, 366 N.W.2d 444, 448-49 (N.D. 1985).
113. However, if the severed legal counterclaim is tried first, the equitable case
remaining may be subject to issue preclusion or claim preclusion under the doctrine of res
judicata. Claim preclusion prevents the "relitigation of claims or issues that were raised or
could have been raised in a prior action between the same parties or their privies and
which was resolved by final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction." Hofsommer v.
Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 383 (N.D. 1992). Issue preclusion prevents
the "relitigation, in a second action based on a different claim, of particular issues of either
fact or law which were, or by logical . .. implication must have been, litigated and
determined in the prior suit." Id. Thus, there is also the danger that if the equitable case is
tried first, the legal case may be bound by those determinations as well.
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the jury before the equitable issues are tried to the court.'" 4 If the
legal and equitable issues "are so interrelated that a decision in the
nonjury portion might affect the decision of the jury portion, the
jury portion is to be tried first" in order not to deprive the party
entitled to the jury trial of that right."-' In the context of such a
case, the legal and equitable claims cannot be decided simultane-
ously, but the equitable decision must be made after the jury has
decided the legal issues.
A. ONE FORM OF ACTION
In North Dakota, only one type of action exists: a civil
action. 16 This combination of legal and equitable powers into one
general court was intended to eliminate the distinction between
law and equity by combining both in the same action." 7 Under
the federal rules,' 18 a party may seek both legal and equitable
remedies at the same time in order to avoid delay." 9 The same
court can try both legal and equitable issues in the same case with
the jury rendering a verdict on the legal claims and the court ren-
dering a decision on the equitable issues.' 20
B. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALWAYS MAKE FINDINGS
ON EQUITABLE ISSUES EVEN IF A LEGAL REMEDY
IS GRANTED
In cases where there are concurrent legal and equitable
claims, all of the claims are a part of the same civil action. Accord-
ingly, the court should make the necessary findings on the equita-
ble claims while the jury has made its findings on the legal
claims.' 2' Whether the equitable claims will result in equitable
remedies as a part of the judgment depends upon whether they
114. Landers v. Goetz, 264 N.W.2d 459, 463 (N.D. 1978).
115. Id.
116. N.D. R. Civ. P. 2. Law and equity have been fused in North Dakota since
statehood, and the law in the Territory of Dakota gave courts of general jurisdiction the
power to grant legal or equitable relief from the first territorial legislative session in 1862.
See Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261, 267 (N.D. 1976) (recognizing the benefit of legal
remedy when equity fails).
117. N.D. R. CIv. P. 2. explanatory comment.
118. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are identical to the North Dakota Rules. See
N.D. R. Civ. P. 2. explanatory comment.
119. See United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U.S. 328, 332 (1959).
120. DePinto v. Provident Sec. Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1963).
121. In a case in which the equitable remedy failed because it was impossible to
perform, and the trial court granted legal damages instead, the supreme court noted that it
would involve a "needless waste of time and money" for the case to be repled and retried.
Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261, 267 (N.D. 1976). The supreme court also found that
the defendant had waived the right to a jury trial and so the trial court did not err by
determining the facts in the legal issue. This implies that even though a legal remedy has
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duplicate the legal remedies. A party is not entitled to equitable
relief if there is an adequate remedy at law.12 2 However, "a party
may obtain an equitable relief even if [that party] has a remedy at
law if the equitable remedy is better adjusted to rendering com-
plete justice. 1 123 The determination that a party is not entitled to
equitable relief because of the existence of an adequate remedy at
law cannot logically be made until after one is able to compare the
two remedies.
C. AN ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT REQUIRED BEFORE
TRIAL
An election of remedies between legal and equitable claims is
not necessarily required under the Rules of Civil Procedure.1 24
Applying the federal rules, a federal court rejected Illinois prece-
dent requiring such an election before trial because Illinois had
separate courts of law and equity, which had been combined for
the federal courts under Rule 2.125 That court concluded that
even when a legal remedy had been granted under a contract for
past damages for fraud, an equitable remedy could still be applied,
if appropriate, for the equitable rescission of the contract as
related to future actions.1 26 Therefore, the legal and equitable
remedies sought were not inconsistent, and the plaintiff's legal
remedy did not preclude the application of an equitable remedy
which was better suited to rendering complete justice.
been granted, the necessary findings on the equitable claims should still be made in case the
legal remedy fails on appeal.
Under Rule 49(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, when the court directs
the jury to return a verdict "in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of
fact[,]" the court must "give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the
matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue." N.D. R. CIV. P. 49(a). The Rule further provides, in pertinent part:
If... the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence,
each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before
the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue
omitted without a demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it
is deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special
verdict.
N.D. R. Civ. P. 49(a). See also Williams County Social Serv. Bd. v. Falcon, 367 N.W.2d 170,
174-75 (N.D. 1985). By following this procedure, it would be reasonable for a trial court to
make findings on equitable issues in accord with the facts as found by a jury's special verdict
form.
122. D.C. Trautman Co. v. Fargo Excavating Co., Inc., 380 N.W.2d 644, 645 (N.D.
1986).
123. A & A Metal Buildings v. I-S, Inc., 274 N.W.2d 183, 189 n.2 (N.D. 1978). See also
Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261, 267 (N.D. 1976).
124. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 573 F.2d 976, 985 (7th Cir. 1978).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 985-86.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A party who has decided that a jury trial is or is not desirable
will have to examine the facts and issues in light of the distinction
between equity and law. The choice of remedies, when there is a
choice, should be carefully considered if the party believes it
important to try the case before a jury or before a judge. The
underlying facts of a case will be much more important to the ulti-
mate decision than a party's labels or characterizations of the
issues.
